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Finney Systematic Theology 1878 Part 8

LECTURE X.

OBEDIENCE ENTIRE.

The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the
law of God.

But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever
called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition,
though apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may
reasonably excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably
nine-tenths of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold
sentiments that are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct
denial of it. They maintain that there is much true virtue in the
world, and yet that there is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law
of God; that all Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly
religious, and yet not one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in
short, that God accepts as virtue that which, in every instance, comes
short of obedience to his law. And yet it is generally asserted in
their articles of faith, that obedience to moral law is the only proper
evidence of a change of heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they
will brand as a heretic, or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to
obey the law; and maintain that men may be, and are pious, and
eminently so, who do not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which
every one knows to be generally held by those who are styled orthodox
Christians, must assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty,
besides the moral law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply
obedience to any law. In this discussion. I shall,–

1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the
moral law; and,

2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this
law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as virtue
or true religion.

1. There can be no rule of duty but the moral law. [2]

Upon this proposition I remark,–

(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the law
of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of
God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the
course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and
relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature
and relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But
if this is right, nothing else can be right. If this course is
obligatory upon us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other
course can possibly be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with
our nature and relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or
less, can be right. If these are not truths of intuition, then there
are no such truths.

(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should he do
it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in his
arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can he alter it, or introduce
any other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else
right than to love him with all the heart, and our neighbor as
ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of
faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is
not made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from
its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and
love or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been
said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can
be, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to
his nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do
this. Nor can any being render anything more than this obligatory.
Indeed, there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral
law. There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions,
and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings
us to the consideration of the second proposition, namely,–

2. That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the
moral law.

That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,
will appear, if we consider,–

(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion:

(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than
the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:

(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the
law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God.
“Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” “Though I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (love), I am become
as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of
prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I
have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity,
I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and
though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity (love), it
profiteth me nothing.” (1 Cor. xiii. 1-3) Love is repeatedly recognized
in the Bible, not only as constituting true religion, but as being the
whole of religion. Every form of true religion is only a form of love
or benevolence.

Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of
selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God’s law, to
obedience to it.

Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth
and the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and
Christ. Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see
when we come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of
love. God is love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is
only love, or the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of
him and of us. Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all
holy beings. Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only
benevolence viewed in particular relations.

Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. That
is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,
virtue.

A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to God
by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ’s account,
is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of full or
entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow brought
men, that is. Christians, into such relations, that God really accepts
from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what his law
requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they render
at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less at
every moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as can
well be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct
inquiries:–

(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to
disobey, the moral law at the same time?

(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present
and full obedience to the moral law?

The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding
lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral
law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,
and partly disobey, at the same time.

We will now attend to the second question, namely,–

Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and
full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can he accept
anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full
obedience, or all that the law requires?

The term justification is used in two senses:

(a) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:

(b) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has
sinned, as if he had not sinned.

It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that
Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and
accepted, and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by
coming short of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands.
They do not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law,
for that at every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they
are justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and
personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts, and
in this sense justifies them when they are in the present commission of
an indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts then righteous while,
in fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully pardoned and
acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by coming entirely
and perpetually short of the obedience which, under the circumstances
the law of God requires. While voluntarily withholding full obedience,
their partial obedience is accepted, and the sin of withholding full
obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the shiner has a mind to give,
and forgives what he voluntarily withholds. This is no caricature. It
is, if I understand them, precisely what many hold. In considering this
subject, I wish to propose for discussion the following inquiries, as
of fundamental importance.

1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every moment,
come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be accepted and
justified?

This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully
withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how great
a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all our
hearts, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted, how much
less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbor, will be
accepted?

Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our
neighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our
neighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not
what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,
then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be accepted.
We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be in a state
of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our neighbor a
little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our neighbors, and
vet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God must be loved
supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme love a loving with
all the heart? But this is full and not partial obedience; yet the
latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or is supreme love,
not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree of love than we
exercise toward any other being? But how much greater must it be?
Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In what scale are we to
weigh, or by what standard are we to measure, our love, so as to know
whether we love God a little more than any other being? But how much
are we to love our neighbor, in order to our being accepted? If we may
love him a little less than ourselves, how much less, and still be
justified? These are certainly questions of vital importance. But such
questions look like trifling. Yet why should they? If the theory I am
examining be true, these questions must not only be asked, but they
must admit of a satisfactory answer. The advocates of the theory in
question are bound to answer them. And if they cannot, it is only
because their theory is false. Is it possible that their theory should
be true, and yet no one be able to answer such vital questions as these
just proposed? If a partial obedience can be accepted, it is a
momentous question, how partial, or how complete must that obedience
be? I say again, that this is a question of agonizing interest. God
forbid that we should be left in the dark here. But again,

2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that
which would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which
we do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin
for which we are forgiven?

The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this
world, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always
withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the
very act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding
God and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services,
fully forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present
and pertinacious rebellion! Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch!
Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in! Yes, this
must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present
full obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that
represents God as receiving to favor a rebel who has one hand filled
with weapons against his throne.

3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,
by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be
honored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear, and
honor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself to the
intelligence of the universe? Will pardon and justification save the
sinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his
heart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can
heaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such
a method of justification?

4. But again: has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of;

Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a
question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has
God, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some
course of conduct which is suitable to him? Has he not given us
intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the
propriety of his public acts? Does he not invite and require scrutiny?
Why has he required an atonement for sin, and why has he required
repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate has a
right to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest terms upon which any
ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same thing,
a return to obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a rebel’s
being pardoned, while he only renounced a part of his rebellion? To
pardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered in, were to
sanction by a public act that which is lacking in his repentance. It
were to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to render full
obedience.

5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the sin
of withholding a part of our hearts from him?

God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire him to
forgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of
forgiveness. While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we
cannot profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy.
And shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even
profess repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease
from sin, is a gross insult to God.

6. But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while
unrepented of? Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is
represented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully
forsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this always
stands revealed, expressly or impliedly, on every page of divine
inspiration.

7. Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin? Where is
such a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every
degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose heart
the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be
condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely, if
the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most
unequivocally teaches this: “If any man keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all.” What is this but asserting,
that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be unavailing,
since the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that partial
obedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable obedience
at all? The doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense that the
law is not at any time fully obeyed, is accepted of. God, is sheer
antinomianism. What! a sinner justified while indulging in rebellion
against God!

But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must intend
fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his
purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of
perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is
intended by this language? We have seen in former lectures, that moral
character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then, perfection
of intention be an indispensable condition of justification, what is
this, but an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a
condition of justification? But this is what we hold, and they deny.
What then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is
intended by the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a
sinner cannot be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes
and intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he
seriously intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God.
Intends to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why,
love, good-willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is
intending to intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is
absurd.

What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of
justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an
intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be
intended, to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe.
Unless he intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full
obedience to the law; that he intends to live without sin. The
supposition is, that he is now sinning; that is, for nothing else is
sin, voluntarily withholding from God and man their due. He chooses,
wills, and intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same
time he chooses, wills, intends, fully to obey the law. What is this
but the ridiculous assertion, that he at the same time intends full
obedience to the law, and intends not fully to obey, but only to obey
in part, voluntarily withholding from God and man their dues.

But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in
him? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless
the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while
there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can
he be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense,
while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the
law, unless it be repealed, continues to condemn him while there is any
degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both be
pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the time
coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which the
law is not uttering its curses against him. “Cursed is every one that
continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to
do them.” The fact is, there never has been, and there never can be,
any such thing as sin without condemnation. “Beloved, if our heart
condemn us, God is greater than our heart;” that is, he much more
condemns us. “But if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence
towards God.” God cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in his
arbitrary will. It is as unalterable and unrepealable as his own
nature. God can never repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ’s sake,
dispense with the execution of the penalty, when the subject has
returned to full present obedience to the precept, but in no other
case, and upon no other possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is
to affirm that God can alter the immutable and eternal principles of
moral law and moral government.

8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial
repentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to
present full obedience to the law of God?

To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose
a new end,–to begin a new life,–to turn from self seeking to seeking
the highest good of being,–to turn from selfishness to disinterested
benevolence,–from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience.
Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a
thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists
in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former
lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist, at the same
time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite ends.
These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of partial
repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to overlook
the very nature of repentance. What! a man both turn away from, and
hold on to sin at the same time! Serve God and mammon at one and the
same time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed both by
reason and by Christ. But perhaps it will be objected, that the sin of
those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God pardons and
accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the inquiry:–

9. Can there be any other than voluntary sin?

What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires
benevolence, good-willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not
willing, but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing
contrary to the commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists
in choosing, willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it
must be intelligent and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is
nonsense to deny that sin is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no
sin, or there is voluntary sin. Benevolence is willing the good of
being in general, as an end, and, of course, implies the rejection of
self-gratification, as an end. So sin is the choice of
self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the rejection of
the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness, naturally
and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal opposites and
antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of the other in the
heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be
no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.

10. Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?

Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that
present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is
overlooking both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin
is selfish willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent
willing. These two states of will, as has just been said, cannot
possibly co-exist. Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full
obedience to the law of God, is voluntarily sinning against God, and is
impenitent. It is nonsense to say, that he is partly penitent and
partly impenitent; that he is penitent so far as he obeys, and
impenitent so far as he disobeys. This really seems to be the loose
idea of many, that a man can be partly penitent, and partly impenitent
at the same time. This idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that
repentance consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the
sensibility. But repentance consists in a change of ultimate
intention–a change in the choice of an end–a turning from selfishness
to supreme disinterested benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly
impossible for one to be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the
same time; inasmuch as penitence and impenitence consist in supreme
opposite choices.

So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the
government of God, but present full obedience to his law.

REMARKS.

1. If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen
into a great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present
sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this
life. If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very
beginning of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all
sin. Sin ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must
that error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in
conscious sin; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in
this world; that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning,
even for an hour or a moment, in this world; and yet to hope for
heaven!

2. How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated
upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one
may be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission
of more or less sin! This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all
the universalism that ever cursed the world.

3. We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die
in his sin, he must sink to hell. Whenever a Christian sins he comes
under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be lost.
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[2] See ante, p. 5.–Exclusiveness.
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LECTURE XI.

OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW.

We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in the
single word, love; that this word is synonymous with benevolence; that
benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of God and
of the universe, as an end, or for its own sake; that this choice is an
ultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good-will to being in
general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question before us is,
what is not implied in this good-will, or in this benevolent ultimate
intention?

Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and
the only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and
what is, implied in entire sanctification, is to be decided, it is of
fundamental importance, that we understand what is, and what is not,
implied in entire obedience to this law. Our judgment of our own state,
or of the state of others, can never be relied upon, till these
inquiries are settled. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were
the notions of the Jews, in regard to what constituted perfection, that
they thought him possessed with a devil, instead of being holy, as he
claimed to be. I will state then, what is not implied in entire
obedience to the moral law, as I understand it. The law, as epitomized
by Christ, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and
with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength,
and thy neighbor as thyself,” — I understand to lay down the whole
duty of man to God, and to his fellow creatures. Now, the questions
are, what is not, and what is, implied in perfect obedience to this
law?

1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of the
soul or body, for this the law does not require; and it would not be
obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent
with natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the
entire consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not
imply any change in them, but simply the right use of them.

2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of
character, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is
nothing, certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional
traits to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly
directed in their exercise.

3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional
appetites or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that
the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities are in themselves
sinful, and that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies
their entire annihilation. I have been not a little surprised to find,
that some persons who, I had supposed, were far enough from embracing
the doctrine of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to
this assumption, in order to set aside the doctrine of entire
sanctification in this life. But let us appeal to the law. Does the law
anywhere, expressly or impliedly, condemn the constitution of man, or
require the annihilation of any thing that is properly a part of the
constitution itself? Does it require the annihilation of the appetite
for food, or is it satisfied merely with regulating its indulgence? In
short, does the law of God any where require any thing more than the
consecration of all the powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body
and mind to the service of God?

4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural
affection, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that
certain persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to have
had a natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean, that,
from the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to injustice
or ill-treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge
ourselves is consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to
the law of God does not imply that we should have no sense of injury
and injustice, when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have it,
and so has every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself, does
not imply, that if he injure you, you should feel no sense of the
injury or injustice, but that you should love him and do him good,
notwithstanding his injurious treatment.

5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind.
Moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical
law. God’s laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral
law cannot require such a state of constant mental excitement as will
destroy the physical constitution. It cannot require any more mental
excitement than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and
circumstances of both soul and body. It does not imply that any organ
or faculty is to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its
capacity. This would soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ of
the body. Whatever may be true of the mind, when separated from the
body, it is certain, while it acts through a material organ, that a
constant state of excitement is impossible. When the mind is strongly
excited, there is of necessity a great determination of blood to the
brain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue, without
producing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And the
law of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental
excitement, inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ
does not appear to have been in a state of continual mental excitement.
When he and his disciples had been in a great excitement for a time,
they would turn aside, “and rest a while.”

Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that the
high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in revivals of
religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must become
deranged? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a high degree of
excitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public and individual
attention, and draw off people from other pursuits, to attend to the
concerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high degree of
excitement is either necessary or desirable, or possible to be long
continued, they have not well considered the matter. And here is one
grand mistake of the church. They have supposed that the revival
consists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in
conformity of the human will to the law of God. Hence, when the reasons
for much excitement have ceased, and the public mind begins to grow
more calm, they begin immediately to say, that the revival is on the
decline; when, in fact, with much less excited emotion, there may be
vastly more real religion in the community. Excitement is often
important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will are
infinitely more important. And this state of mind may exist in the
absence of highly excited emotions.

Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or
intellectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not
need the same strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they
are not produced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth
as strong a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames
of a burning house? Should a mother, watching over her sleeping
nursling, when all is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful
volitions, as might be required to snatch it from the devouring flames?
Now, suppose that she were equally devoted to God, in watching her
sleeping babe, and in rescuing it from the jaws of death. Her holiness
would not consist in the fact, that she exercised equally strong
volitions, in both cases; but that in both cases the volition was equal
to the accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So that persons
may be entirely holy, and, yet continually varying in the strength of
their affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their
circumstances, the state of their physical system, and the business in
which they are engaged.

All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and
disposal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral
energy are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature and
the circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from the
truth than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of
emotion and mental action, on any and every subject alike.

6. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the
direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible
in the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to
think of or love our neighbor as ourselves.

The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is meant
that the mind’s supreme preference should be of God–that God should be
the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of mind is
perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary business
of life–giving to that business that attention, and exercising about
it all those affections and emotions, which its nature and importance
demand.

If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the
promotion of his glory, if his eye be single, his affections and
conduct, so far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy
when necessarily engaged in the right transaction of his business,
although, for the time being, neither his thoughts nor affections are
upon God; just as a man, who is intensely devoted to his family, may be
acting consistently with his supreme affection, and rendering them the
most important and perfect service, while he does not think of them at
all. The moral heart is the mind’s supreme preference. The natural
heart propels the blood through all the physical system. Now there is a
striking analogy between this and the moral heart. And the analogy
consists in this, that as the natural heart, by its pulsations,
diffuses life through the physical system, so the moral heart, or the
supreme governing preference, or ultimate intention of the mind, is
that which gives life and character to man’s moral actions. For
example, suppose that I am engaged in teaching mathematics; in this, my
ultimate intention is to glorify God in this particular calling. Now in
demonstrating some of its intricate propositions, I am obliged, for
hours together, to give the entire attention of my mind to that object.
While my mind is thus intensely employed in one particular business, it
is impossible that I should have any thoughts about God, or should
exercise any direct affections, or emotions, or volitions, towards him.
Yet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is excluded, and my
supreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a state of entire
obedience, even though, for the time being, I do not think of God.

It should be understood, that while the supreme preference or intention
of the mind has such efficiency as to exclude all selfishness, and to
call forth just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and
emotion, that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty to which
the mind may be called, the heart is in a right state. By a suitable
degree of thought and feeling, to the right discharge of duty, I mean
just that intensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature
and importance of the particular duty, to which, for the time being, I
am called, demand, in my honest estimation.

In making this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain
together with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that
the requisite amount of thought, feeling, etc., are possible. If the
physical constitution be in such a state of exhaustion, as to be unable
to put forth that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might
otherwise demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far
below the importance of the subject, would be all that the law of God
requires. Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire obedience
implies a state of entire abstraction of mind from everything but God,
labors under a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as
inconsistent with duty, as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh.

The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have been and
generally are, grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what they
never did, or can, mean, consistently with natural justice. Many a mind
has been thrown open to the assaults of Satan, and kept in a state of
continual bondage and condemnation, because God was not, at all times,
the direct object of thought, affection, and emotion; and because the
mind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and excited to the
utmost at every moment.

7. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ was
not in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of his mind was
never broken up, but the surface or emotions of his mind were often in
a state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of great
calmness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have his history in
the Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken. For
example, Christ had all the constitutional appetites and
susceptibilities of human nature. Had it been otherwise, he could not
have been “tempted in all points like as we are;” nor could he have
been tempted in any point as we are, any further than he possessed a
constitution similar to our own. Christ also manifested natural
affection for his mother and for other friends. He also showed that he
had a sense of injury and injustice, and exercised a suitable
resentment when he was injured and persecuted. He was not always in a
state of great excitement. He appears to have had his seasons of
excitement and of calm–of labor and rest–of joy and sorrow, like
other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience to the
law, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as if
every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of love to
God, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a
great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In short,
his history would lead to the conclusion that his calmness and
excitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case.
And although he was sometimes so pointed and severe in his reproof, as
to be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet his emotions and
feelings were only those that were called for, and suited to the
occasion.

8. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without
any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners. Anger at sin is only
a modification of love to being in general. A sense of justice, or a
disposition to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the
government, is only another of the modifications of love. And such
dispositions are essential to the existence of love, where the
circumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ, that he
was angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. “God is
angry with the wicked every day.” And holiness, or a state of
obedience, instead of being inconsistent with, always implies, the
existence of anger, whenever circumstances occur which demand its
exercise.

9. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no
sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love.
Justice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is
another of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings,
exercise all those dispositions that constitute the different
modifications of love, under every possible circumstance.

10. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike,
irrespective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being
may have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more
importance to the universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of
love require us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all
beings and things according to their nature, relations, circumstances,
and value.

11. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations. Such an
interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to yield
obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in us
the possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is
not a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation.
And a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite
knowledge. It is plain that the law of God cannot require any such
thing as this.

12. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever. It
is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every man
perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him from any
mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but would merely
say, the law does not expressly or impliedly require infallibility of
judgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use we can of all
the light we have.

13. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge we might have
possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The law
cannot require us to love God or man, as well as we might have been
able to love them, had we always improved all our time in obtaining all
the knowledge we could, in regard to their nature, character, and
interests. If this were implied in the requisition of the law, there is
not a saint on earth or in heaven that does, or ever can, perfectly
obey. What is lost in this respect is lost, and past neglect can never
be so remedied, that we shall ever be able to make up in our
acquisitions of knowledge what we have lost. It will no doubt be true
to all eternity, that we shall have less knowledge than we might have
possessed, had we filled up all our time in its acquisition. We do not,
cannot, nor shall we ever be able to, love God as well as we might have
loved him, had we always applied our minds to the acquisition of
knowledge respecting him. And if entire obedience is to be understood
as implying that we love God as much as we should, had we all the
knowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a saint on
earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.

14. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have
rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or
suppose, that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of
body or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it
simply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of
the law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demand only to the
full amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral
being, however great or small.

The most perfect development and improvement of our powers, must depend
upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure from their
perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development, and a
curtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and best
manner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and curtailing
the powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so much,
incapable of performing the service they might otherwise have rendered.

To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught an
opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed his feet with
her tears, when he said, “To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth
much.” But can it be that Christ intended to be understood as teaching,
that the more we sin the greater will be our love, and our ultimate
virtue? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that the
more sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If
our virtue is really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would
not be good economy, both for God and man, to sin as much as we can
while in this world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such
principle as this. He undoubtedly meant to teach that a person who was
truly sensible of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the
love of gratitude than would be exercised by one who had a less
affecting sense of ill-desert.

15. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that might
have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin. We cannot
believe anything about God of which we have neither evidence nor
knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intellectual
perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to believe
in Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have no
knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than in
a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and greater
faith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would imply much
greater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more of God
than man does. Let it be always understood, that entire obedience to
God never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is naturally
impossible for us to believe that of which we have no knowledge. Entire
obedience implies, in this respect, nothing more than the heart’s faith
or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by the intellect.

16. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our
prayers. It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience implies
the offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. To
this I reply,–Then Christ did not obey, for he offered no such prayer.
The law of God makes no such demands, either expressly or impliedly. We
have no right to believe that all men will be converted in answer to
our prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise to that
effect. As, therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no
obligation to offer such a prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the
world imply, that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God’s
law.

It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an
express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas was
not converted in answer to Christ’s prayer, does not prove that Christ
did not fully obey.

Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or
impliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers; or, in
other words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant
of the existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect
love implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly
speaking can be duty, of which the mind has no knowledge. It cannot,
therefore, be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely
ignorant, or the application of which to any specific object we do not
understand.

If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the
soul neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be
understood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the
neglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is
inconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth; for such
neglect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that
of which we have no knowledge. James says, “He that knoweth to do good
and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” “If ye were blind,” says Christ,
“ye should have no sin, but because ye say, We see, therefore your sin
remaineth.”

17. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others will
of course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely
conformed to the law.

It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ
was possessed of a wicked instead of a holy spirit. Such were their
notions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed him to be actuated by
any other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on
account of his opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the
ungodliness of the religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not
see, that when the church is, in a great measure, conformed to the
world, a spirit of holiness in any man would certainly lead him to aim
the sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life of those in this state,
whether in high or low places? And who does not see, that this would
naturally result in his being accused of possessing a wicked spirit?
And who does not know, that where a religious teacher finds himself
under the necessity of attacking a false orthodoxy, he will certainly
be hunted, almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of his
day, whose authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed?

18. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering. It was
not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for our
own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and
vigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had
sinned less; or sorrow for those around us–sorrow in view of human
sinfulness, or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of
joyful love to God and man, and indeed are the natural results of it.

19. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society–with
mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as
some have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of papists
in retiring to monasteries, and convents–in taking the veil, and, as
they say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state of
voluntary exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent with
any degree of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love to
our neighbor.

20. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing is
further from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom,
perhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that “he was so cheerful as
often to be accused of being gay.” Cheerfulness is certainly the result
of holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this
world than it does in heaven.

In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian
holiness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does
obedience to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply? Instead
of bringing everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. On
the one hand, they include things that the law of God never required of
man in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block and a snare
for the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage, supposing that this
is the way to keep them humble, to place the standard entirely above
their reach. Or, on the other hand, they really abrogate the law, so as
to make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter away what is really
implied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements, but a sickly,
whimsical, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism, which in its
manifestations and results, appears to me to be anything but that which
the law of God requires.

21. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do
our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or
ever, terminates on duty as an ultimate end. It is our duty to aim at
or intend the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an
ultimate end, or for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end
at which we are at all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this.
While we aim at this, we do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing
duty.

Nor does it imply that we always think, at the time, of its being duty,
or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation
is a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral
agent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral
agency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to
the moral law, that moral obligation should at all times be present to
the thoughts as an object of attention.

Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of benevolence
is, at all times, the object of the mind’s attention. We may intend the
glory of God and the good of our neighbor, without at all times
thinking of the moral character of this intention. But the intention is
not the less virtuous on this account. The mind unconsciously, but
necessarily, assumes the rightness of benevolence, or of willing the
good of being, just as it assumes other first truths, without being
distinctly conscious of the assumption. It is not therefore, at all
essential to obedience to the law of God, that we should at all times
have before our minds the virtuousness or moral character of
benevolence.

22. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself
should be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind’s
attention. The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in
the form of an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which
every moral agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a
rule of duty, is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in
the mind of every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily
takes along with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to
himself. Nevertheless, this law or idea, is not always the object of
the mind’s attention and thought. A moral agent may exercise good-will
or love to God and man, without at the time being conscious of
thinking, that this love is required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I
am not mistaken, the benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so
spontaneously, as not, for much of the time, even to think that this
love to God is required of him. But this state of mind is not the less
virtuous on this account. If the infinite value of God’s well-being and
of his infinite goodness constrains me to love him with all my heart,
can any one suppose that this is regarded by him as the less virtuous,
because I did not wait to reflect, that God commanded me to love him,
and that it was my duty to do so?

The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the
good of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I will
that end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the
law be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will
that end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not
virtue; that unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend
obedience to moral law, or to God, it is not virtue; I answer, that the
objection involves an absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the
good of God and of being, as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The
reason of the choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I
will the good of being as an ultimate end, I will it for the right
reason.

It is impossible to will God’s good as an end, out of regard to his
authority. This is to make his authority the end chosen, for the reason
of a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will
anything for the reason that God requires it, is to will God’s
requirement as an ultimate end. I cannot, therefore, love God with any
acceptable love, primarily, because he commands it. God never expected
to induce his creatures to love him, or to will his good, by commanding
them to do so.

23. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should
practically treat all interests that are of equal value according to
their value. For example, the precept, “Love thy neighbor as thyself,”
cannot mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul, and the soul
of every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does it mean that
I should take the same care and oversight of my own, and of all the
families of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of
property, or time, or talent I have, equally among all mankind. This
were–

(1.) Impossible.

(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the
universe by each individual’s giving his attention particularly to the
promotion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so
under his influence that he possesses particular advantages for
promoting them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its
relative value; but our efforts to promote particular interests should
depend upon our relations and capacity to promote them. Some interests
of great value we may be under no obligation to promote, for the reason
that we have no ability to promote them, while we may be under
obligation to promote interests of vastly less value, for the reason,
that we are able to promote them. We are to aim at promoting those
interests that we can most surely and extensively promote, but always
in a manner that shall not interfere with others promoting other
interests, according to their relative value. Every man is bound to
promote his own, and the salvation of his family, not because they
belong to self, but because they are valuable in themselves, and
because they are particularly committed to him, as being directly
within his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the
government of God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we
proceed in our investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent
misapprehension, and, on the other, avoid the necessity of
circumlocution, when we wish to express the same idea; the true intent
and meaning of the moral law, no doubt, is, that every interest or good
known to a moral being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic
value, and that, in our efforts to promote good, we are to aim at
securing the greatest practicable amount, and to bestow our efforts
where, as it appears from our circumstances and relations, we can
accomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all
question, only by each one attending to the promotion of those
particular interests which are most within the reach of his influence.

On this day